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Abstract
For over 50 years the Antarctic has been governed through the Antarctic
Treaty, an international agreement now between 49 nations of whom
28 Consultative Parties (CPs) undertake the management role. Ostensibly,
these Parties have qualified for their position on scientific grounds, though
diplomacy also plays a major role. This paper uses counts of policy papers
and science publications to assess the political and scientific outputs of all
CPs over the last 18 years. We show that a subset of the original 12 Treaty
signatories, consisting of the seven claimant nations, the USA and Russia, not
only set the political agenda for the continent but also provide most of the
science, with those CPs producing the most science generally having the
greatest political influence. None of the later signatories to the Treaty appear
to play a major role in managing Antarctica compared with this group,
with half of all CPs collectively producing only 7% of the policy papers.
Although acceptance as a CP requires demonstration of a substantial scientific
programme, the Treaty has no formal mechanism to review whether a CP
continues to meet this criterion. As a first step to addressing this deficiency,
we encourage the CPs collectively to resolve to hold regular international
peer reviews of their individual science programmes and to make the results
available to the other CPs.
Antarctica is one of few areas of the world where
science is the predominant activity and where the
publications it produces can be linked to policy and
political initiatives in a straightforward fashion. It is
governed by international agreement and managed
according to the Antarctic Treaty and its subsidiary
conventions and protocols which together comprise the
Antarctic Treaty System (ATS; Jacobssen 2011). Although
seven nations have sovereignty claims to parts of it, and
two (USA and Russia) reserve rights to make claims in
the future, these are currently set aside by Article IV of
the Treaty. The Treaty was signed in Washington, DC,
in 1959 by 12 nations, comprising the seven claimant
nations plus five others who together had undertaken
substantial scientific work in Antarctica during the
International Geophysical Year (195758). It came into
force in 1961 after ratification by all signatories and now
has 49 signatories (Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty
2012) that together represent around 65% of the world
population. As the Treaty developed the original Parties
determined a two-tier structure: those countries that
acceded and conducted substantial scientific work were
classed as Consultative Parties (CPs) and those who
acceded but were not active on the continent were
classed as Non-Consultative Parties. Only the CPs were
allowed to participate in taking decisions, including the
admission of new Parties to the Treaty and their elevation
to CP status (Pannatier 1994).
The motivations for agreeing an Antarctic Treaty were
political not scientific, in essence calling a truce on
territorial dispute and preventing the militarization of
Antarctica, but the centrality of science is enshrined
in the heart of the Treaty (Scully 2011). It is explicit
in Article II: ‘‘Freedom of scientific investigation in
Antarctica and cooperation to that end as applied during
the International Geophysical Year, shall continue, sub-
ject to the provisions of the present Treaty.’’ The fun-
damental purpose of the ATS is therefore to protect the
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continent, and associated islands south of 608S, as a
region of peace and science. The Protocol on Environ-
mental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (PEP), signed in
1991 and in force from 1998, introduced a very strict
environmental management regime aimed at minimizing
human impact upon the continent whilst reaffirming
the priority of science there. The PEP included the
requirement to create a new advisory body for the ATS:
the Committee for Environmental Protection (CEP),
which came into being in Tromsø in 1998.
The Treaty allows any nation with an interest in
Antarctica to join, but is silent on the procedure by
which they may achieve Consultative status. It simply
says that only those (the CPs) that can demonstrate that
they are carrying out ‘‘substantial scientific research
activity such as the establishment of a research station
or the dispatch of a scientific expedition’’ (Paragraph 2 of
Article IX of the Treaty) can participate in decision
making. The definition of ‘‘substantial scientific research’’
was left deliberately vague initially, but when in 1977
Poland applied to join a procedure was needed. This was
developed at a Special Antarctic Treaty Consultative
Meeting and required the applicant to notify the deposi-
tary government (the USA) and provide information
on its programmes, especially the scientific ones. The
depositary government then circulated the informa-
tion for comment by the other CPs and the govern-
ment hosting the next ATCM then convened a Special
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting at the start of the
next meeting where the application was discussed and
a decision taken. Poland had included the establishment
of an overwintering station as part of its bid. From then
on the expectation was that such a station should be
part of a bid, though the general guidelines (Brazil
Ministry of External Relations 1987: paragraph 49)
formulated by the CPs in 1987 only required a full
description of current planned scientific programmes and
of the planned means for carrying out the planned
programme. In 1990 the Netherlands successfully made
the case not to establish its own station on environmental
grounds when it became a CP, planning to work with
other countries to utilize spare capacity on their stations
on an agreed basis (Pannatier 1994). Though the CPs do
judge suitability on the basis of the criteria, less tangible
political factors, perhaps having more to do with wider
diplomatic issues than Antarctica, also appear to play a
significant part. There is no formal mechanism within the
Treaty for reviewing whether an existing CP continues to
meet the criterion although at least one international
lawyer believes that consultative status could be formally
lost if research ceases (Auburn 1979). However, since the
ATS works through consensus it seems highly unlikely
that a CP would join a consensus calling for itself
to be ejected!
The formal business of the AT is conducted only at
annual meetings known as Antarctic Treaty Consultative
Meetings (ATCMs) or occasional Special ATCMs. All
decision making is by consensus of the CPs. For the
first 16 years membership was limited to the original
12 signatories, with little apparent incentive for other
countries to join. However, two factors*the attempt by
the Parties to agree on a convention for the management
of Antarctic mineral resources, and the possibility of
conducting a review of the Treaty itself after 30 years*
stimulated other countries to join and achieve consul-
tative status.
Matters for discussion at the ATCM are raised either in
the form of Working Papers (WPs), which are translated
into the four Treaty languages and require debate and
action, or in Information Papers (IPs) that are informative
only and are neither normally translated nor necessarily
discussed. All CPs and the three Observers*the Scientific
Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR), the Commis-
sion for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living
Resources (CCAMLR) and the Council of Managers of
National Antarctic Programs (COMNAP)*can table WPs
whilst invited Experts, such as the International Associa-
tion of Antarctic Tour Operators (IAATO) and
the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC),
can only table IPs.
The ATS is undoubtedly a very successful regime for
the governance of Antarctica and for fostering scientific
research there. Yet there have been few attempts to assess
how well it is working and how CPs individually and
collectively lead and engage in its business. Recently
there have been bibliometric studies of the various
Parties (Dastidar & Persson 2005; Dastidar 2007; Walton
2010). However, it seems that there has not been a
published study of leadership and engagement within
Table 1 Counting rules for scoring the contribution by Party to each
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM) policy paper.
Counting case Count
Single party, single target
(either ATCM or CEPa)
Scores 1
Single party, targeted to
both CEP and ATCM
Scores 0.5 to each target
Two parties, single target Scores 0.5 each party
Two parties, two targets Scores 0.25 to each target for each Party
Multiple (n) parties, one
target
First named scores 0.5, others each
score 0.5/(n1)
Multiple (n) parties, two
targets
First named scores 0.25 for each target
others each score 0.25/(n1) to each
target
aCommittee for Environmental Protection.
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the business of the ATCM since 1971 (Hanevold 1971),
although there have been various attempts to look at the
political drivers for each of the CPs (Rowland 1988;
Dodds 1997). Nor has there been any study of how a CP’s
political engagement is related to its scientific track record
in Antarctic research. In this paper we describe a quasi-
quantitative method for estimating leadership within the
AT, use this to compare and contrast the performance of
the Parties, and finally, bring these results together with
bibliometric measures of scientific output.
Our hypothesis is that the number of WPs and IPs, and
the relative mix of such, that a Party puts forward to
ATCMs over a period of several years is a measure of
that Party’s degree of leadership and engagement within
the AT. We recognize that this does not provide a
comprehensive measure, firstly because CPs also engage
by debating/revising/blocking proposals, and secondly
because we have not sought to analyse the content of
individual WPs or IPs. However, we do contend that our
approach does provide a very good first order measure
from which significant conclusions can be drawn. In
making this analysis we have opted to concentrate on
the period from 1992 onwards since the PEP was signed
in 1991 and came into force in 1998, providing the
opportunity to compare and contrast the period of
preparation to 1997 (pre-PEP) with the period from
1998 onwards (post-PEP). Also, the number of CPs does
not change significantly through the period (only two
Parties have achieved CP status since 1992: Bulgaria in
1998 and Ukraine in 2004) and accurate data on paper
attributions are available.
Methods
It is necessary to adopt some simple counting rules to
take account of papers co-authored by several Parties,
and also for the post-PEP period papers that are tar-
geted at either the CEP or the ATCM (Plenary or other
Working Groups) or sometimes at both. Since, in the case
of multiple Party authorship, it is usual to list Parties
alphabetically our counting scheme probably disad-
vantages such Parties as the USA, UK and SCAR in
comparison with Argentina, Australia and ASOC, but we
believe such bias is small.
Since 1998, when the PEP came into force, all of the
IPs and WPs presented at each ATCM are publically
available in full on the website of the Secretariat of the
Antarctic Treaty. Pre-PEP, we have relied on data amassed
by UK members of the SCAR delegation to the ATCM and
tabulations of papers available in the Annual Reports
from ATCMs.
The data on peer-reviewed scientific publications are
abstracted from Web of Knowledge (http://wok.mimas.
ac.uk/) using ‘‘antarct*’’ as the keyword, following the
methods of earlier work by Dastidar & Persson (2005).
We also recognize that such a simple selector will
disadvantage those science papers from Antarctica deal-
ing with global phenomena such as cosmology, mag-
netics, ionospherics and SunEarth interactions where
the keyword is often not included in the title, abstract
or keywords and this is likely to affect at most a
small number of countries, particularly Australia, UK
and USA.
Results and discussion
In the distribution of the total numbers of WPs (Snwp)
produced by each party for the whole period from 1992
to 2010 (Fig. 1) the UK stands out as the strongest
performer overall, closely followed by New Zealand and
then Australia. These three CPs form an obvious leader-
ship group ahead of all others and together they have
produced 42% of all WPs. All are claimant states, all have
a long association with Antarctic affairs, the UK in
particular having been the leading nation in the early
expeditions of discovery to Antarctica. The top ten Parties
consist of all seven claimants, the USA, Russia (who both
reserve rights to make claims) and SCAR. The claimants
produce 65% of WPs whilst all 10 Parties together
produce 82% of all WPs. If both IPs (Snip) and WPs are
aggregated for the whole period 19922010 (not shown)
then the picture remains the same for the top three
contributors, but for the top 10, two of the claimant CPs
(France and Norway) are replaced by IAATO and ASOC,
reflecting their great contribution in IPs.
WPs clearly carry much more weight than IPs in terms
of demonstrating engagement in the Treaty, as the ATCM
rules require WPs to be discussed whilst IPs are discussed
only on request. We have therefore compared what
emphasis Parties put on the one compared with the
other, using a normalized index, Rw, for each Party to
demonstrate this, where
Rw
X
nwp
X
nip

=
X
nwp
X
nip

Thus, if a Party produces more WPs than IPs overall then
0BRw51; while if it produces more IPs than WPs then
15RwB0. Figure 2 gives the results of this analysis for
the period after the PEP came into force, where the
Parties are ordered with respect to Snwp (largest at the
bottom), and CEP and ATCM counts are aggregated.
Only four Parties have consistently generated more WPs
than IPs. All four are claimants and it is notable that the
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two CPs that have produced the most WPs overall fall in
this group. Also, with but few exceptions, the emphasis
put on producing WPs compared with IPs grows with the
number of WPs produced.
There are marked differences between the behaviour
exhibited by some Parties before and after the PEP came
into force in 1998, as illustrated by Fig. 3. New Zealand,
Argentina and the UK have a very consistent behaviour
pre- and post-PEP, Australia has become relatively more
active post-PEP whilst Chile shows the opposite behav-
iour. The USA, Norway, France and Russia have been
much more engaged post-PEP than pre-PEP. Notably, the
USA produced very few WPs indeed in the pre-PEP
period. SCAR, Germany and the Netherlands seem to
have become less engaged. In the case of SCAR, this
probably reflects the fact that its role within the Treaty
has been changed by the increasing activities of the CEP
post-PEP.
To the extent that production of WPs does represent
leadership and engagement, none of the nations that
acceded to the Treaty after the original 12 nations has
made any major impact compared with that of the seven
claimant nations, the USA and Russia. To that extent the
Antarctic Treaty remains the preserve of this rather select
group, all of whom have either long-term connections,
claims, strong wider geopolitical or major scientific
interests, or all four of these, to spur them to give
relatively high priority to the Treaty. The ‘‘Imperial
Three’’ of UK, Australia and New Zealand are clearly
dominant, echoing an earlier historical context. In 1919
the British politician Leo Amery wrote on behalf of
the British Government to the Governors General of
Australia and New Zealand proposing that the British
Empire should adopt a policy of territorial claims
that would bring the whole of Antarctica under the
control of the Empire (Dudeney & Walton 2011). This
policy was vigorously pursued in the 1920s and into
the 1930s, and though not ultimately fully successful,
did bring most of the continent within the Empire.
It is hence notable that these three CPs have dominated
the business of the ATS consistently over the period,
though they nowadays do not necessarily speak with
one voice!
The 14 least involved CPs contribute fewer than 7%
of the WPs. This is an interestingly heterogeneous
group comprising both developed European democracies
(Finland, Spain, Sweden), former Communist European
states (Bulgaria, Poland, Ukraine), two of the largest
Fig. 1 Total sum of Working Papers produced by each of the Parties to the Antarctic Treaty for the period 19922010, ordered by descending total
number from the left-hand side of the plot. The figure includes the following abbreviations: SCAR (Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research),
COMNAP (Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programs), CCAMLR (Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources),
ASOC (Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition) and IAATO (International Association of Antarctic Tour Operators).
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economies in the world (China, Japan), major emerging
economies (Brazil, Korea), three small South American
states (Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay) and one of the original
12 signatories (South Africa).
Of the Observers, SCAR is clearly the leader and it
should be noted that it was established prior to the
birth of the Treaty and has always been its major
science advisor (Walton 2011; Walton & Clarkson
2011). COMNAP (Fowler 2000) is a consistent con-
tributor in the top half of the Parties to the Treaty,
but perhaps has not had as much impact as its mem-
bers might have hoped when it separated from SCAR
in 1988. CCAMLR sees its role at treaty meetings as one
of liaison and its input of papers reflects this passive
approach.
We have given a broad picture of the CPs perform-
ance on the diplomatic stage. How does this compare
with their commitment to, and productivity from, their
scientific programmes in Antarctica, noting that they
must demonstrate a ‘‘substantial scientific research
activity’’? The number of peer-reviewed publications
produced by a CP is compared with its number of
WPs in Fig. 4. Generally, the more engaged a CP is in
the diplomacy the greater will be its output of science*
which is reassuring. However, this is true only to the
zeroth order and given the very disparate nature of the
Fig. 2 Normalized plot comparing production of Working Papers with that of Information Papers for the period 19982010. See the text for
the definition of the index Rw. The figure includes the following abbreviations: IAATO (International Association of Antarctic Tour Operators),
ASOC (Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition), CCAMLR (Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources), COMNAP (Council of
Managers of National Antarctic Programs) and SCAR (Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research).
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CPs in terms of gross domestic product, population, level
of development etc. this is hardly surprising.
The criterion to become and remain a CP is the
demonstration of substantial scientific research activity. This
is not a quality measure, rather it addresses quantity but
in an ill-defined way. Figure 4 shows that some Parties
produce almost no publications*can this be fairly
represented as substantial? Furthermore, as the Dastidar
& Persson (2005) results show, some CPs have a lower
scientific output than several of the Non-Consultative
Parties, and even nations who are not Parties at all.
Though the rules of the Treaty do contain a rather
general and ill-defined mechanism by which the CPs
must reach consensus on whether a candidate CP
qualifies, once qualified there is no mechanism for
assessing whether the criterion continues to be met. As
we have already noted, even if there was, consensus
decision making means that there can never be a
procedure for expelling a CP on the grounds that it no
longer has a substantial programme. Even so, it seems
Fig. 3 Normalized plot of the annual average productivity (AP) of a party compared with the overall average (AA), presented separately for the
period up to and including 1997 (pre-PEP) and from 1998 onwards (post-PEP). The figure shows a normalized index, RA, where RA(APAA)/(APAA),
for each of the parties ordered with respect to Snwp (largest at the bottom), with filled bars for the post-PEP period and open bars for the pre-PEP
period. A value of RAB0 indicates that the party concerned is performing less well than the average, whilst RA0 shows a better than average
performance. The figure includes the following abbreviations: IAATO (International Association of Antarctic Tour Operators), ASOC (Antarctic and
Southern Ocean Coalition), CCAMLR (Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources), COMNAP (Council of Managers of
National Antarctic Programs) and SCAR (Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research).
Leadership within the Antarctic Treaty J.R. Dudeney & D.W.H. Walton
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very strange that the ATS, which apparently prides itself
on its bedrock of science, has no formal mechanism for
critical review of CPs research performance. There has
been at least one suggestion at an ATCM that SCAR
should be requested to review the science undertaken by
all Parties in the Antarctic but SCAR has resolutely
refused to accept such a potentially divisive activity
(Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty 2005, paragraphs
183b and 192). Several CPs have had independent
international reviews of their Antarctic programmes
carried out both to inform their policy makers and
improve their science quality, but, as far as we are aware,
only Finland has ever made the results of such a review
public (Dudeney et al. 2006) and explicitly brought those
results to an ATCM (Finland 2007). This prompted a re-
evaluation of Finland’s research objectives which was the
subject of a further paper at the following ATCM (Finland
2008). We encourage the ATS to recommend that all CPs
should have regular international peer reviews of their
programmes and should make the results available to the
other CPs. As a minimum, leading CPs could voluntarily
follow Finland’s lead to encourage the others.
In a first attempt to assess the extent of the possible
costs associated with leadership in Fig. 5 the data are
normalized using gross domestic product figures for 2010.
This presents a very different distribution. There is still a
clear correlation between scientific productivity and WP
productivity, but it is now possible to draw some initial
conclusions about the value for money of the investment
in Antarctica for different CPs’ performance compared
with their general world ranking. New Zealand stands
out, putting great priority on full engagement in Antarc-
tic affairs (but benefitting greatly from its close associa-
tion with US logistics). It leads a small group of countries
(Chile, Argentina, Australia, the UK and Norway), all of
them claimants, that do the same. By contrast the USA is
now way down the pecking order. China sits at the very
bottom left hand corner of the plot. However, this may be
giving a false picture as China’s gross domestic product
and its production of science papers has grown dramati-
cally over the period covered, a trend which shows every
sign of continuing.
We conclude that at present the Treaty remains
effectively a select club dominated by the claimant
Fig. 4 Log/log plot of the number of Working Papers produced by all Consultative Parties compared with their output of science papers from
1992 to 2010.
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nations and the Cold War warriors (USA and Russia), and
that the return on the investment in Antarctic activities
in terms of significant science or political initiatives seem
lacking for several countries. Further more detailed
investigations seem warranted to determine how scien-
tific investment is related to subject leadership, what are
the key science papers and their effects, what regional
groupings (for example South American or European
countries) can do to develop particular political ideas and
how Antarctic science relates to Earth System Science in
an increasingly fragile world.
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